ideologically-motivated supporters willing to trade off office for putative long term gains and whose distaste for the parties of the centre-right and right far outweighed their ambivalence about their counterparts on the centre-left. Since such parties could not countenance letting the right into government, they could be relied upon not to pull the plug on a Labour or Labour-led administration -in short, they are captive parties that, in the words of the famous children's verse, 'always keep a-hold of nurse for fear of finding something worse'. To the right of the SAP and Labour lay a group of parties that, because they spent more of their time publicly scrapping for shares of a seemingly limited centre-right vote, found it difficult (though not necessarily impossible) to present the electorate with a convincing alternative government. Indeed, in New Zealand, one (in 2002) and then 9 two (in 2005) of these parties have made it plain that they are prepared -possibly even more prepared -to work with Labour rather than with the conservative and market-liberal parties that make up the opposition.
The ability of the divided and fragmented potential opposition to defeat a minority Labour government in either Sweden or New Zealand is compromised by the 'negative parliamentarism' practiced in both countries.
In accordance with the 10 Instrument of Government (Chapter 6, article 2), the Swedish Prime Minister needs to be confirmed in office by a parliamentary investiture vote, but this he can 'win' as long as those opposed to him cannot muster an absolute majority of the Riksdag (i.e., 175 out of 349) to vote against the nomination. After that, all governments in Sweden have to do is to avoid defeat on motions of no-confidence: as long as the vote against them does not exceed more than half the seats in parliament (i.e., an absolute majority) they are safe.
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Technically (if not practically) things are more complicated for a government in New
Zealand. Negative parliamentarianism operates: like her Swedish counterpart, the prime minister (or more precisely her government because there is no formal investiture vote) has to be defeated on, rather than actually win on, votes of 'confidence or supply'. But, unlike him, she can be defeated by a simple majority (ie a majority of those who vote or record an abstention rather than a majority of seats in parliament). And, arguably, there is another reason why the likelihood that a prospective government will be either prevented from forming or overturned between elections is even smaller in Sweden than in New Zealand. In a Scandinavian consensual parliament with a committee system that makes a Westminster-style legislature look puny by comparison, the so-called 'policy influence differential' (the extent to which parties not in the government can hope to affect if not effect policy) is much lower -something generally considered to facilitate minority government .
Minority government in Sweden may also be all the more likely not just for institutional reasons, but also because its politicians, its voters and its media are by now acculturated to the prospect. Until recently, when it has become evident that minority rule does not spell the end of stable government and good economic growth, opinion surveys consistently suggested that it was clearly the least preferred governing option amongst New Zealanders.
CONTRACT PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF MINORITY GOVERNANCE
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As tables 1 and 2 indicate, minority governments have long been the norm in Sweden and in recent years in New Zealand as well. But, in and of itself, a shared tendency toward minority government does not explain the development in both Sweden and
New Zealand of what we label contract parliamentarism. The latter term refers to the increasing formalisation, indeed institutionalisation, of the 'support agreements' arrived at by minority governments and the parties that supply them with a legislative majority which effectively guarantee that government's survival. These agreements, by virtue of their breadth and the fact that they effectively exclude other parties, go beyond the more specific and more promiscuous 'legislative accommodations' by which minority governments in Denmark build shifting coalitions capable of getting them from one bill to the next. The arrangements used to be similar in Sweden.
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Until the 1980s, the Swedish Social Democrats could trust the Communist Party to keep them in power without raising many specific demands for negotiated policy concessions by the Social Democrats. Instead the Social Democrats could often govern by forming ad hoc legislative coalitions with one or more of the nonsocialist parties. The support arrangements of the second half of the 1990s, however, are qualitatively different from the informal support arrangements earlier in the period. Although, as we mentioned above, it is not unheard of, in most polities such agreements do not seem to be recorded in writing and certainly not made publicly available. In New
Zealand and (most of all) in Sweden, the public recording of such agreements is now the norm -and they are getting longer and more specific. As such, they both symbolise and institutionalise a developing system of not so much minority government as minority governance. what -after the number of points mentioned in it -became known as the 121 Points Programme, the latter contained eleven broad headings, as oppposed to the five covered in the previous agreement, including sound public finances, gender equality, a green and sustainable Sweden, promoting the welfare of children, improving working life, fairness in housing, improvements for the elderly, regional economic survival. Under these headings points covered specific policies as diverse as ensuring a 2% surplus in the public finances to a national phone helpline for battered women.
The 'contract' also included the setting up of a 'co-ordination office' in the finance ministry, to which up to three representatives from each party can be appointed paid for from the government budget. Additionally, both support parties were each allowed to second up to six political advisers to other ministries and were accorded a party leaders meeting every month. Responding to concerns about unfair creditclaiming by the social democrats between 1998 and 2002, the parties also agreed a system of joint press conferences.
The support arrangement between the Green Party and the Labour-led minority government of New Zealand between 1999 and 2002 was not underpinned by a signed agreement of the kind published in Sweden in 1998. However, in return for support on confidence and supply, along with promises of 'good faith' cooperation and confidentiality to promote stable government, the Greens were to be consulted on (and given some opportunity to contribute to) policy in areas they considered to be priorities (eg energy, transport). They were even permitted to make budget proposals -albeit very low cost ones. four of them and they were all seen as minor (and more importantly almost costless)
concessions. For another, the government agreed to consult its support party in 'a 17 timely fashion'. Finally, the arrangement between United and the government stated that both sides would be expected to publicly support policy initiatives arising out of negotiations between them that lead to 'an agreed position'. Although this part of the agreement explicitly stated that United 'will not be bound by collective responsibility', it was at the very least moving the government-support party relationship in the direction of a shared enterprise -some kind of hybrid, perhaps, between, on the one hand, a guarantee of survival in return for specific concessions and, on the other, coalition membership proper.
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The agreement between New Zealand's Labour-led minority government and the Green Party, too, was something of a hybrid, falling short of a guarantee of support on confidence and supply yet going beyond mere neutrality, let alone opposition.
Interestingly, however, most of the differences between their 1100 word long Cooperation Agreement and the 800 word long Agreement for Confidence and Supply signed with United Future were arguably differences of degree rather than kind. As a result of the Greens agreeing to 'a constructive relationship based on good faith for this term of Parliament' and, with the government, agreeing to 'co-operate on agreed areas of policy development and legislation in order to facilitate the implementation of a shared agenda', they were promised a relationship with the government that was potentially closer than the one they 'enjoyed' between 1999 and 2002.
Consultation between the government and the Greens was divided into three press releases, speeches; or supporting agreed Green Party amendments to legislation.' In return, the Greens promised to support government on procedural motions and in select committees connected to any resulting legislation -legislation which both they and the government (as in its agreement with United Future) would be expected to publicly support. On category B issues, it was agreed that 'there will be consultation on the broad direction of policy and related primary legislation, with a ! 15 view to achieving support for these. Issues in this category will be identified as they arise. All issues requiring primary legislation will be in Category B....' On category C, there was to be simply 'a sharing of information'. That such an arrangement called into question the idea that the Greens were lower down the pecking order than the government's 'official' support party, United Future, was confirmed when the latter successfully demanded that the same ABC categorisation apply to its policy consultation.
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Whichever of the smaller parties 'won', however, two of New Zealand's shrewdest political observers were right to suggest that the decision to negotiate and sign such documents is bound to set a lasting precedent. Not only will minority governments be expected -for political and constitutional reasons -to have formal support agreements, but henceforth potential support parties are also likely to regard a suitably worded accord...as an essential condition for any commitment on confidence and supply. Equally, any party...that has ideological affinities with the governing parties, yet...is unwilling to offer...support on confidence and supply, can be expected to seek an appropriately worded cooperation agreement. On the first question -explaining the formalisation of support party arrangements in the two countries -we need to begin by looking at institutional design and voters' expectations of appropriate behaviour. Taking the latter first, it is clear that both countries have a long history (although in Sweden not an exclusive one) of singleparty government. Perhaps because of this the political class, the public and the media in both New Zealand and Sweden are uncomfortable with the idea that the government formation process takes time. In both places, prolonged negotiations are rendered very difficult by the fact that those undertaking and those observing the process start to get jittery if it looks as if the process might take much longer than a week or so. In New Zealand, this self-imposed (and media-policed) timeframe is no doubt a legacy of a Westminster past where government transition occurred literally overnight. In Sweden, under negative parliamentarism, the same tradition can be identified.
23
! 18
Also crucial is the institutional context, and in particular the much greater extent to which the budgetary process frames and structures parliamentary politics. The annual spending plans of the government in Wellington are not unimportant, but they are severely constrained -especially in the short term -by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994, whose provisions also mean that measures likely to mean change in the upcoming financial year have been well-trailed in previous years. Since elections in New Zealand must take place every three years, this relatively long term planning horizon makes it vital for a minority government to obtain full-term majority support if it is to have a hope of redirecting the public finances -something which reinforces the trend to contract parliamentarism. However, it also means that there is little potential for the kind of year-on-year variability (and, more bluntly, new spending) that would drive it into very wide ranging agreements over a whole host of headings with potential support parties.
Things are very similar in Sweden. A new budget procedure was instituted in 1996.
Prior to that reform, the budget process was widely seen as prolonged and badly coordinated. It was also prone to increased spending, as the parliament never actually took a decision on the whole budget. Rather, each item was decided individually, and ! 21
Yet the weakness of the larger parties is in some ways more apparent than real, which explains why the big parties have managed to avoid the claims of the smaller parties that they should be included in government as full coalition partners rather than simply support it from, as it were, the outside. The smaller parties may have picked up on the fact that their 'walk-away' value has increased. But they are also well 25 aware that it is founded on an illusion, namely their capacity to persuade their supporters that they could or should do a deal with more right wing parties should the centre left fail to offer them enough to persuade them to allow it to govern.
In Sweden, in 2002, the Miljöpartiet de gröna did just about everything it could to preserve this illusion, even going so far as publicly to conduct parallel negotiations with components of the 'bourgeois bloc' about a supposedly centrist alternative. But agreement. Likewise, we have a good idea why Miljöpartiet 'blinked' and allowed the SAP to form a minority government instead of inviting it into coalition; but why did it, too, move in the direction of contract parliamentarism?
A not necessarily wrong-headed (but ultimately unverifiable) cultural explanation might emphasise that we are dealing here with two countries where the commitment to transparency and contractualism in the public sector has gone about as far as anywhere else in the OECD. Rather less generally, one could point to the fact thatperhaps in response to new public management best practice, perhaps as a response to a decline in political trust of and between political parties -coalition agreements are almost everywhere becoming more common, more detailed and more public. 32 Accordingly, we should not be surprised if the same thing happens to documents that might profitably be seen as a subtype of the species.
But a more specific and more realistic answer in both cases is that support parties in that year (and the ones signed by United and New Zealand First) reflect a desire to avoid more of the same. Firstly, for instance, it was felt that policy commitments must be as specific as possible to avoid the problems of slippage that rather vaguer statements of aims to cooperate in a particular policy area led to. Secondly, both parties complained about the fact that the governments with which they were dealing made ruthless use of their support parties' relative lack of parliamentary resources (particularly in terms of staff) to bounce them into agreeing to policy and legislation with which they were presented as virtual fait accomplis with just days to go before a decision was required. The new agreements insist on early involvement in the loop, and in the case of the Swedish Greens go back to the deal engineered by the Centerpartiet between 1995 and 1997 to place their own advisors (partly as a kind of early warning and information gathering system) in a number of ministries. Thirdly, both Swedish and New Zealand Greens also complained about the fact that the government either failed to properly and publicly support their initiatives or else failed to give them credit (or tried to steal it) for those initiatives that were adopted with more enthusiasm. The new agreements tie the administration try to prevent the governments either damning their support parties' initiatives with faint praise or, on the other hand, stealing their thunder. Finally, both sets of Greens thought there was insufficient high-level contact with the leaders of the government. This is provided ! 27 for in the new agreements and was a crucial part of the 2002 contract in Sweden. The main point of negotiating and publishing the agreements, then, is to tie down governments and thereby improve on the past. But there can be little doubt that they will, almost by accretion, set precedents that will render similarly (and probably even more) detailed support agreements the sine qua non of minority government in both countries.
FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD: THE RELATIVE PACE OF CONTRACT PARLIAMENTARISM IN SWEDEN AND NEW ZEALAND
The accretion of precedent also goes some way to answering our second question, namely why Sweden has moved further toward contract parliamentarism than New Zealand, although arguably the latter, by dint of support parties being awarded ministerial posts in 2005, is catching up fast. That the 121 Points Programme is much longer and more detailed, and the fact that the support parties now have staff located in certain key ministries, cannot be unrelated to the fact that Scandinavia has had far more experience of multi-party and coalitional politics than the South Pacific. There is clearly more experience to build on.
Some of the difference in pace and detail might thus be explained by the reaction to New Zealand's unfortunate experience of government formation after the first PR election of 1996. The deal achieved (between New Zealand First and National) was preceded by a long-drawn out process and underpinned by a long and legalistic coalition agreement covering every policy imaginable down to the minutest detail.
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The tight constraints thus imposed failed to prevent, and possibly made more likely, the acrimonious break-up of the coalition a year and a half later -an event which, in spite of evidence from overseas that such agreements were normal and workable, predisposed New Zealand's politicians and press to conclude that they (and the time it took to negotiate them) should be avoided if possible. This consensus clearly suits a large party like Labour, since they have as much, if not more, to lose from agreements that constrain their room for manoeuvre -particularly on policy. However, the What the smaller, newer parties make of such a gesture is another matter. Despite considerable cynicism and wariness about their respective Labour parties, some of them continue to believe that, eventually, the hands of the latter will be extended not to palm them off but instead to haul them aboard. On this optimistic take, working to the spirit and the letter of increasingly formalised support party arrangements constitutes an apprenticeship that allows them to demonstrate their reliability and responsibility, their readiness for government and their acceptability as a coalition partner. Consequently, the electorate gives them credit for providing stability, their sometimes reluctant members realise that they are able to make policy gains by working with the government but also how much more they might get if they joined it, and the government realises that they're not so bad after all. The support parties in teleology -an assumption that eventually all new parties will (if they last long enough, grow big enough and become moderate enough) situate themselves within one of the blocs and then inevitably take their turn when their 'side' wins the election.
Even ignoring the contested question of bipoloarisation, in countries prone to minority government, this progress from infancy to office may never happen. New parties may grow up only to bang their heads on a glass ceiling. Contract parliamentarism helps to dull their pain but simultaneously symbolises and institutionalises their arrested development. They could of course try breaking through the glass ceiling by refusing to support a minority government led by their closest mainstream party, calling its bluff and letting it go down to defeat on confidence or supply. But in so doing they would -at least in the short term -risk the wrath not just of the electorate in general, but those who voted for them on the assumption that they would keep a particular mainstream party in office. Nor would ! 32 they necessarily please any but the most partisan of their membership, many of whom would rather have a small piece of something than a whole lot of nothing.
Contract parliamentarism has allowed even captive parties like the Greens and Vänsterpartiet to raise their status. They can hardly be called slaves: they have a document setting out terms and conditions of their employment and their (policy) remuneration package, and they are theoretically free to leave when (or even before) their bargain expires. But are they much more than servants? Better treated they may be. But they are still only allowed to join their masters for specific activities, at specific times and in specific places, in effect allowing those masters to continue life in the comfort to which they have grown accustomed despite the fact that they are now living (in terms of electoral support and therefore parliamentary weight) beyond their means. And there is little to suggest that contracts dramatically improve either the performance or the lot of the 'servant' or 'safety net' parties themselves.
Nor is the development of contract parliamentarism necessarily good for democracy itself. If one side of the left-right divide is made up of one strong party plus one or two 'servant parties' while fragmentation on the other side is so pronounced that some of its more centrist members are also willing to play servant, too -as is the case in Sweden and New Zealand -the prospects for government alternation begin to look bleak. Contract parliamentarism, by institutionalising a minority government's security of tenure, may make it less easy for voters to 'throw the rascals out' and exacerbate already high levels of cynicism about politics and political parties. ! 37
